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INTRODUCTION

No one critiques legal ethics jurisprudence within the framework
of liberalism better than David Luban. Professor Luban identifies
himself as a communitarian liberal,1 and in Legal Ethics and Human
Dignity he focuses on individual moral rectitude. 3 Until now, at least,
Professor Luban has not had much to say about "structural" cont
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
I See David Luban, The Self: Metaphysical Not Political, I LEGAL THEORY 401, 402
(1995).
2

DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY

(2007)

[hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL

ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY].

3 See id. at 1 ("This is a book about legal ethics that focuses on the lawyer's role in
enhancing or assaulting human dignity."); DAVID LUBAN, A Different Nightmare and a Different Dream, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 131, 132 [hereinaf-
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cerns-namely, how lawyers' locations within institutions that organize access to power shape or should shape those lawyers' conduct. In
this Essay, however, I aim to show that, in Professor Luban's most recent work, another approach slips in as a supplement to his still dominant individualist framework. In this emerging supplement,
structural concerns become increasingly important. What Professor
Luban views as ethical conduct changes depending on context, especially on the relative social positions of the actors involved. This Essay
proposes such a reading of Professor Luban's new work and explores
some of the implications and possible lines of inquiry offered by it.
Legal Ethics and Human Dignity is not a novel, but reading it brings
the same literary pleasures of being transported to a more aesthetically pleasing world as does settling down with a work of really good
literature. The world Professor Luban constructs through his lucid
prose is one of gentle humanity, in which one can approach the
problems confronting our terribly confused and violent times through
the tempered judgment of a truly superior mind. In Legal Ethics and
Human Dignity, as in his entire body of work, Professor Luban sets the
standard for how a law professor can act as a public intellectual, writing for an intelligent, but not necessarily expert, audience in a manner that pleases with its careful attention to "craft values"' 4 of analytic
clarity, vivid argumentation, coherent organization, and creative
imagery.
Indeed, sometimes the world Professor Luban constructs through
the marvels of his prose is so much more intelligible than the world
that appears in today's newspapers that it appears almost quaintly old
fashioned. Professor Luban gives us a picture of the community in
which he grew up, for example, in which the only lawyer he knew was
his father's friend, a sole practitioner "who lunched at Benjy's Delicatessen to shoot the breeze, over corned-beef sandwiches."'5 In Professor Luban's world, lawyers' personal integrity matters. Lawyers should
not paper deals in which "the price is right,"6 but, "if [they] were to
think it through, [those lawyers would] realize [that they were] going
to ruin the lives of thousands of people and their families. ' 7 Lawyers
should bring the same moral compass to political appointments at the
ter LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream] ("[Tihe integrity of the legal system depends to an
enormous degree on the rectitude of the legal advisor.").
4
I borrow this term from Professor Luban. DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of
Washington, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 162, 198 [hereinafter LUBAN, Torture Lawyers].
supra note 2, at 1.

5

LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY,

6

DAVID LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY,

supra note 2, at 209, 235 [hereinafter LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance].
7
DAVID LUBAN, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, supranote 2, at 267, 289 [hereinafter LUBAN, Integrity] (quoting LAWRENCEJOSEPH,
LAWYERLAND

41 (1997)).
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highest levels of government. For Professor Luban, even those government lawyers who sought through cautious internal maneuvering
to change the Bush Administration's policies condoning torture did
not go nearly far enough; they should have voiced righteous protest
instead. 8 Lawyers' fundamental ethical mission should be to promote
human dignity. Most often, lawyers do this by giving voice to the stories of "flesh-and-blood" clients, 9 though Professor Luban also recognizes that lawyers make an important contribution to "human dignity
by knitting together thousands of details that make it possible for ordinary people to accomplish ordinary business smoothly." 10 But contemporary lawyers involved in work such as assisting evils committed by
"quiet men with white collars,"11 fall outside the scope of Professor
Luban's ethical approbation.
In this Essay I argue that, although individual integrity continues
to matter most in Professor Luban's world view, it increasingly matters
in the context of structural relations in which lawyers' ethical duties to
particular clients vary. Individual clients facing powerful institutional
adversaries deserve client-centered representation, but lawyers representing impersonal and powerful institutions have different ethical responsibilities. In general, Professor Luban approves most of lawyers'
work involving the protection of the less powerful against those who
12
would exercise power to cause others great harm.
I proceed as follows: In Part I, I examine, as necessary to set up
my later analysis, several of the many contributions of Professor
Luban's work to the field of legal ethics. In Part II, I argue that a
structuralist supplement to Professor Luban's still predominantly individualist approach has begun to slip into his analysis to help him do
certain analytic work that a purely individualist perspective cannot accomplish. In Part III, I discuss several possible implications of this
shift in perspective, focusing especially on tough questions that arise
in thinking about lawyers' ethics in the face of chronic conditions of
institutional injustice. Combined with a structuralist supplement, the
analysis in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity points to important ques8

See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 4, at 173-74 (commending JAG officers that

criticized the OLC and the Bush Administration's process, and deploring the outmaneuvering of Administration critics); see also DAVID LUBAN, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, reprinted in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 237, 266 [hereinafter
LUBAN, Wrongul Obedience] ("The thought that a small number of righteous dissenters can
sometimes sway the judgment of a larger majority is a profoundly hopeful one.").
9 DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders ofHuman Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting
It), in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 65, 87 [hereinafter
LuBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity].
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 4.
10
11 LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance,supra note 6, at 216 (quoting C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE
LETTERS AND SCREWTAPE PROPOSES A TOAST (Collier

12

See id. at 232-35.

1962)).
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tions about how to design institutional mechanisms that protect and
respond constructively to dissent. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity compels us to think about these
questions in the context of government lawyering, where questions of
lawyers' ethical conduct within institutional constraints have become
especially pressing today.
I
LUBAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL ETHICS THOUGHT

A. The Relevance of Personal Morality to Legal Ethics Analysis
Professor Luban's writing about legal ethics in the 1970s and
1980s, in conjunction with the writings of fellow moral philosopher
Richard Wasserstrom, changed a foundational assumption within academic legal ethics thought. Professors Luban and Wasserstrom effectively demolished arguments that lawyers' special "role morality"
justifies bad acts on behalf of clients that would be wrong from the
standpoint of personal morality. 13 After Professors Luban and Wasserstrom applied their philosophers' analytic tools to the issue, it became
difficult to assert role morality claims to justify lawyers' conduct without more. Questions about how lawyers should go about adhering to
the dictates of personal morality in client representations remained
far from resolved, of course; but Professors Luban and Wasserstrom's
work established that these were the questions requiring analysis. Professor Kruse discusses this point at greater length in her insightful es14
say, so I will not belabor it here.
B.

Lawyers' Practice as Key to Understanding Law

A second contribution of particular interest to my inquiry is Professor Luban's growing interest in lawyers' practiceas a key question in
the analysis of law. 15 This is a point to which Professor Luban returns
repeatedly in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity.' 6 He argues that, in order to gain insights in the study of law generally, scholars should focus
on what lawyers, rather than judges, do and think. 17 Professor Luban
13

See DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN

DIGNrrY, supra note 2, at 19, 57-62 [hereinafter LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse]; Richard
Wasserstrom, Lauyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
14 See Katherine R. Kruse, The Human Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELL L. Rv. 1343,
1347-51 (2008) (making a similar point about the importance of the Luban/Wasserstrom
analysis).
15 See LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 3, at 131-32.
16 See, e.g., LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 65, 68-73.
17 See LuBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 3, at 131-32; see also Anthony V. Alfieri,
Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1309 (2008) (noting how Professor
Luban's ideal of moral activism "locates moral responsibility for injustice in the daily practice of law," such as the judgment of local prosecutors that can be made based on "insider's
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writes: "[A] better standpoint for jurisprudence is that of the lawyer,
not of the judge .. . The lawyer-client consultation is the primary
point of intersection between 'The Law' and the people it governs[.]"' 8 Moreover, Professor Luban argues that the "most characteristic legal events are the meeting and the handshake, not the court
order."19 In contrast to Ronald Dworkin's metaphor of "Law's Empire,"20 Professor Luban proposes as a better metaphor "law's landfill,
the dregs of legal authority contained in the millions of lawyer-client
21
conversations on which our actual legal civilization is erected."
Of course, the idea that law is to be found in what ordinary lawyers do, rather than in what grand judges announce, is by no means
new: legal realists such as Karl Llewellyn organized whole academic
careers around this insight in the 1920s and 1930s. 2 2 But the idea is
still far from established within the legal academy, where most scholars still focus on courts, judges, and legal texts. 23 What Professor
Luban's endorsement contributes is his stature as a leading legal philosopher on the world stage.
In his earlier work, Professor Luban was very much the brilliant
philosopher writing about law from an external viewpoint; but in his
latest work he has immersed himself within law practice and thus is
able to apply his special philosopher's skills from this internal vantage
point. In his latest work, Professor Luban reveals himself as a subtle
situational moralist and an ethically sensitive law practitioner. He
reveals his increasingly endogenous view of lawyers' practice dilemmas
when he writes passages such as: "I don't think that the misdeed of
and outsider's perspectives of moral obligation"); Kruse, supra note 14, at 1343 (also noting Professor Luban's attention to daily practice decisions).
18 LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 3, at 131.
19 Id. at 151.
20
See id. at 160-61 (discussing RONALD DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
21 Id. at 160. Sometimes Professor Luban even seems to claim that it is the ordinary
lawyers of "everyday life" whose work really matters in shaping our legal world. See LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 4. Legal scholars should focus more on
"humdrum" legal work, as lawyers doing it are "'architect[s] of social structure[ ].'" Id. at
3, 4 (quoting LON L. FULLER, The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures, in THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECrED ESSAYS OP LON L. FULLER 264, 265 (Kenneth I. Winston ed.,
1981)). Here I think Professor Luban is sometimes, but not necessarily, correct. The question of how much power "little guy" lawyers have in shaping the course of society should be
treated as an empirical one. Avenues of influence and agency must be detected and studied. See, e.g.,
Susan Carle, Re-Valuing LaryeringforMiddle Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
719, 733-35 (2001) (noting differences between models of public interest lawyering developed in the late nineteenth century by grassroots and elite lawyers and lamenting the dominance of elite lawyers' model today).
22
See generally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973)
(examining central ideas motivating Llewellyn's career and scholarship).
23
See, e.g., Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'V 807, 808 (2000) ("Legal scholarship is still largely aboutjudicial opinions. Theories
about what the law is-the legal realists notwithstanding-are still mainly about what judicial opinions have said about the law.").
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putting on a fundamentally truthful case that may have a few unimportant false details-which the lawyer does not know are false-really
24
is a misdeed."
This passage seems noticeably different from Professor Luban's
earlier work in its sympathy for lawyers, and I will further explore its
implication in Part II. But first, I note a final major contribution of
Professor Luban's work as relevant to this analysis: his use of empirical
findings from experimental psychology to better understand the nature of individual moral judgment.
C.

Luban's Use of Experimental Psychology Data

Consistent with his focus on examining the dilemma of personal
moral integrity in the face of social pressures to do wrong, Professor
Luban draws, in his latest work as well as in earlier writing, on a series
of famous social psychology experiments that reveal many individuals'
extreme susceptibility to social pressures to conform despite the dictates of fundamental morality.2 5 In one set of such experiments,
known as the Milgram Obedience Experiments, subjects proved willing to inflict high-voltage electric shocks on persons apparently writhing in pain. These subjects usually complied so long as experiment
supervisors directed them to administer the shocks and other subjects
appeared to follow those instructions. 2 6 Indeed, sixty-three percent of
the experimental subjects administered such electric shocks, even
when the persons on whom they thought they were administering
such shocks first complained of pain; then protested more loudly;
27
then screamed in apparent agony; and finally fell ominously silent.
In another famous experiment, known as the Stanford Prison Experiment, volunteer undergraduates took part in a mock prison experiment. 2 8 Experimenters randomly assigned half of the students to
the role of guard and half to the role of inmate.29 Within a very short
period, guards began to act sadistically toward inmates while inmates
began to show signs of depression, anxiety, and rage. 30 One student
assigned the role of guard wrote in his diary about a prisoner who
refused to eat:
That is a violation of Rule Two... and we are not going to have any
of that kind of shit .... I decide to force feed him, but he won't
See id. at 235.
See, e.g., LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 8,at 238-42 (describing the Milgram
Obedience Experiments and their relevance to ethics analysis).
26 See id. at 239-42.
27 See id.at 239-40.
28 See LUBAN, Integrity, supranote 7, at 280-81 (describing the design and results of the
24
25

Stanford Prison Experiment).
29
See id. at 280.
30
See id.
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eat. I let the food slide down his face. I don't believe it is me doing
31
it. I just hate him more for not eating.
Other researchers in a variety of countries and settings have replicated
these experiments or variations on them. 32 Their basic import appears well established: When a seeming authority commands and
others obey, a majority of people will commit atrocious moral acts in33
volving the infliction of pain and suffering on other human beings.
Professor Luban uses these results to excellent effect in developing his arguments about the difficulties of maintaining one's personal
moral compass in the face of contrary social pressures. In Legal Ethics
and Human Dignity, he develops his theme with a witty twist by defining the problem as "integrity," in the sense that human beings, confronted with situations in which their actions appear to belie their
previously espoused moral beliefs, seem effortlessly to revise those beliefs to correspond to their actions, even without awareness of what
they are doing. 34 This, for Professor Luban, is the problem of integ35
rity that requires a cure.
Professor Luban's work on the causes and cures for the problematic working of personal integrity in this sense is a great contribution
to legal ethics thinking. As always, he cuts to the core of the issues as
few others can. In my teaching experience, law students especially
love this work, finding it enormously helpful in shoring up their resolve to face the moral challenges they anticipate as they venture into
the deeply morally compromised world of contemporary large firm
practice. 36 But, useful as this work is, it leaves unanswered questions
about institutional design, a topic I address in Part III.
First, however, I must persuade readers of my thesis that a subtle
structuralist supplement is emerging in Professor Luban's latest work.
I undertake this task in Part II below.

31
Id. (quoting Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Socialization into Criminality: On
Becoming a Prisoner and a Guard, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHoLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 198, 209 (June L. Tapp & FeliceJ. Levine eds., 1977)).
32 See LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 8, at 240.
33 See id. at 241-42.
34 See LUBAN, Integrity, supra note 7, at 285 ("[Tjhe quest for integrity, manifested in
all the psychological phenomena we have been reviewing, can drive us to behavior as disconcerting and morally repellent as that shown in the Stanford Prison Experiment or in
Milgram's demonstration.").
35
Id. ("The quest for integrity kills, and in killing it leaves the survivors with their own
sense of rectitude intact, like a tattered flag flapping in the wind over the fallen.").
36 See, e.g.,
David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in LAwvERs' ETHICS AND THE
PURSUIT OF SOCIALJUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 355 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005) [hereinafter
LAwYERs' ErIcs].
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II
LUBAN'S STRUCTURALIST SUPPLEMENT

I confess that I have sometimes associated Professor Luban's work
with an almost rigid uprightness about matters of right and wrong, but
someone reading his latest work could never make such a claim. As I
will show in this Part, to Professor Luban today moral rights and
wrongs, on matters such as lawyers' duties with regard to truthseeking
and truthtelling, involve difficult questions that must be analyzed in
context. Several illustrations from Legal Ethics and Human Dignity illustrate this turn in Professor Luban's analysis. One involves his discussion of a factual scenario taken in very general terms from his
consulting work in an international human rights clinic. 37 Another
details the plight of Lady Mason in Anthony Trollope's Orley Farm.38
In both illustrations, Professor Luban appears to propose that one
should examine lawyers' ethical duties on matters of truthseeking and
truthtelling with close attention to the relative structural positions of
the actors involved.
A.

Lawyers' Truthseeking Function
1.

Miriam's Case

One example of Professor Luban's context-specific, structurally
sensitive analysis is his description of the case of a hypothetical client,
Miriam, a political activist who has fled from a dictatorship and is seeking political asylum in the United States.39 Miriam must prove that
she faces a realistic fear of persecution if she returns to her home
country, and she has a good deal of persuasive evidence on this issue. 40 But Miriam is evasive about allowing her lawyer to interview her
brother, whom her lawyer has discovered lives nearby. 4 1 When
pressed, Miriam gets "flustered and alarmed," "won't look the lawyer
in the face," and eventually even has "tears in her eyes" and "gets an43
gry." 4 2 Miriam's reaction puzzles the lawyer.
There are many possible reasons why Miriam does not want the
lawyer to interview her brother to obtain further corroborating information about the persecution she has faced, but one of them, which a
lawyer being honest with herself cannot legitimately ignore, is that the
brother may fail to corroborate Miriam's story with respect to certain

41

See
See
See
See
See

42

Id.

43

See id.

37
38
39
40

infta Part II.A.1.
infra Part 1I.A.2.
LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 6, at 232-34.
id. at 232-33.
id. at 233.
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details. 44 Many important factual details are established by independent evidence, but some are not. 45 For example, "What if, despite her
friend's testimony, the police never threatened her with death? Or
what if she was never raped or beaten in prison, but said she was because someone (wrongly) told her that otherwise she wouldn't get asylum?" 46 Here is the lawyer's dilemma, in Professor Luban's words:
To insist on interviewing Miriam's brother, or even pressing Miriam
on the issue, runs the risk of learning that parts of her story are
untrue. In that case, the lawyer is ethically bound to retract court
filings containing the false details. Doing so, however, would dynamite Miriam's credibility, even though the details aren't essential to
proving her case; and a case that Miriam deserves to win is lost,
47
perhaps at the cost of her life.
It is in this context that Professor Luban writes passages in which he
condones the lawyer's decision to be "an unrepentant ostrich" and
not push Miriam to consent to the interview of her brother, in which
the lawyer may discover uncomfortable factual inconsistencies in the
48
details of her story.
Professor Luban hastens to add, however, that he continues to
adhere to "the conclusion that as a general rule, lawyers should avoid
willful ignorance of inconvenient knowledge," except in "extreme
cases like Miriam's. '49 To support his long-standing claim that lawyers
should usually seek the truth in client representations, Professor
Luban presents the contrasting case of lawyers who "paper questionable deals for questionable clients because the price is right. ' 50 Here,
Professor Luban argues, willful ignorance of the true underlying facts
5 1
is not ethically supportable.
Although he is correct on this last point, Professor Luban may
mis-estimate the infrequency or extremeness of situations like Miriam's case. Surely to a lawyer who regularly handles political asylum
cases, many representations pose issues similar to Miriam's. The same
would appear to be true for criminal lawyers who regularly represent
clients accused of serious crimes for which they are likely to face harsh
sentences if convicted-or for some high-stakes civil cases, such as that
in Orley Farm, as discussed below. 52 Thus, some quality other than rar44
45
46
47
48

See id.
See id.

Id.
Id. at 233-34.
See id. at 234-35.

49
50

Id. at 235.

51

See id.

Id.

52 See infra Part II.B (discussing ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (Alfred A. Knopf
1950) (1862), and also discussing DAVID LUBAN, A Midrash on Rabbi Shaffer and Rabbi Trol-
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ity or extremeness must distinguish the cases that call for a strong proclient approach, including some measure of willful ignorance, from
the cases that warrant a more demanding approach to truthfulness
about questionable client claims.
In short, Professor Luban is precisely on point both in his analysis
of Miriam's case and in the contrast he draws between it and the kinds
of cases in which a more searching approach to questions of truthfulness may be appropriate. However, it remains necessary to probe further the principle that distinguishes these two categories of cases.5 3 In
the first category, Miriam's vulnerability in the situation and the fact
that her very life is at stake support the lawyer's highly zealous, proclient approach. 54 In the second category, the lawyers are plainly
working for wealthy clients-that's why "the price is right"-and are
doing questionable deals, presumably because something about them
offends moral considerations. 55 In other words, a factor that appears
to distinguish some contexts from others for Professor Luban is the
relative power of the clients involved as balanced against the power of
the opposing interests affected by the representation. Professor
Luban seems poised on the verge of acknowledging a situation-specific ethics that is importantly influenced by the structural locations of
56
the actors involved.
The same structural considerations seem to guide Professor
Luban's analysis in other portions of the book. One such example is
his last section, perhaps my favorite of the many I admire in Legal
57

Ethics and Human Dignity.

2.

Orley Farm

In the last essay in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, A Midrash on
Rabbi Shaffer and Rabbi Trollope,Professor Luban intertwines an analysis
of Orley Farm with religiously based reflections on the moral necessity
of truthtelling by clients, as well as with the corresponding duty of
truthseeking by their lawyers. 58 Professor Luban further interweaves
his analysis of Trollope with his friendly disagreement with Christian
lope, in LUBAN,

LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY,

supra note 2, at 301 [hereinafter

LUBAN,

Shaffer and Trollope]).
53
See LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 6, at 232-35.
54
See id. at 232-34.
55
See id. at 234-35.
56
See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. This approach to ethics analysis is
one I have tentatively argued for elsewhere. See Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factorin Lawyers'
Ethical Deliberations, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (2006) [hereinafter Carle, Power as a Factor]
(arguing for a context-sensitive approach to legal ethics analysis that shifts between clientcentered and justice-centered perspectives depending on the balance of power among the
interests involved in the representation).
57
See LUBAN, Shaffer and Trollope, supra note 52, at 301.
58
See id. at 306-25.
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legal ethicist Thomas Shaffer on some points of literary interpretation. Professor Luban structures this essay so that it unfolds as a series
of inter-layered dialogues: Professor Luban addresses Shaffer; Jewish
and Christian ethics illuminate each another; and Trollope's text
communicates with biblical ones. 59 Just as the essay unfolds in counterpoint, so does its thesis emerge in a dialectic fashion, with insights
60
gained from interacting tensions among ideas.
Orley Farm has as its central character the lovely but impecunious
Lady Mason, who long ago forged a codicil to her elderly husband's
will, which gives her newborn son, Lucius, the benefit of a modest
property after her husband (his father) dies. In fact, her deceased
husband had intended the property, along with all his other assets, to
go to his older, uncharitable, and quite nasty son, Joseph. At the
opening of the novel, only Lady Mason knows this. The settling of her
husband's will took place long before; she and her adult son, Lucius,
live quietly at Orley Farm, to which Lucius fully believes he is the
rightful heir.
On Professor Luban's analysis, Orley Farm examines a number of
paradoxes. One is the paradox of property, in that "the law of property protects titles that invariably originated in crimes against the law
of property. ' 61 On this question, Trollope's novel shares a common
thread with biblical texts: "an ambivalence, or even skepticism, toward
the moral claims of property. ' 62 With respect to religious tradition,
"Jews have located injustice in oppression born of inequality," just as
"alongside an exalted regard for the law, the Hebrew Bible expresses
an ambivalence about legalism." 63 Professor Luban attributes this ambivalence to the "attraction so many Jews feel toward political radicalism and political moralism." 64 As Professor Luban writes, "How could
it be otherwise, when our founding stories are about the divinely sanctioned subversion of laws that safeguard the rights of property, and
65
our prophets denounce the humiliation of the poor by the rich?"

Professor Luban sees similar dialectic tension in Trollope's "opposition of justice and law. "66 Professor Luban reads Trollope as
presenting this dialectic "in a distinctly feminist form" by posing "women's justice against men's law."'67 On Professor Luban's view, Trol59
60
61

See id.
See id. at 328-31.

62

Id. at 316.
Id. at 317.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 319.

67 Id. This trope reminds me of the work of Professor Luban's colleague, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, whose now-classic work explored similar themes between a feminized
"justice" and a masculinist "law" in Shakespeare's work. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
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lope raises this tension but declines to resolve it.68 Shaffer describes
Lady Mason as a "guilty woman" for forging the property deed, but
Professor Luban thinks Trollope intends to leave the issue ambiguous,
in order to reflect an ambivalence about the morality of truthtelling
over lying in situations in which justice is at tension with law. 69 At the
end of Orley Farm,after a spiritual advisor has talked Lady Mason into
70
disclosing the truth, she stands as a "broken and defeated" woman.
Her "[t] ruthfulness exacts a terrible toll," not only on herself, but also
on her son Lucius, who feels compelled to leave his home community
for distant lands, and on her frail, elderly, and kindly fianc6, with
whom she breaks off her engagement.7 1 As Professor Luban points
out, "Trollope never tells us whether he thinks the price was worth
paying.

72

Maybe sometimes not telling the truth is better than the opposite
tack. Just as a community was born from Rebekah's lie in the Bible,
73
"families whose members do not disclose secrets sometimes thrive."
In other words, truth, justice, human well-being, and community
flourishing do not necessarily co-habitate; analysis of the ethics of situations in which truthtelling may cause great harm to human well-being should proceed with this awareness in mind.
Professor Luban points out that Trollope exhibits the same ambivalence about lawyers' roles in seeking truthfulness in the course of
a client representation.7 4 Trollope presents an array of lawyers with a
spectrum of stances on this question. 75 The lawyer Dockwrath, who
dredges up Lady Mason's long-forgotten misdeed, is a bitter and despicable character, motivated by a grudge. 76 Lady Mason's longstanding legal advisor, Thomas Furnival, is unwaveringly loyal to her
interests (and probably also unduly smitten with her, which raises its
own set of ethics issues beyond what Professor Luban wants to explore).77 Furnival shows no interest in exploring whether the deed is
78
a forgery, although he has clearly long worried about that possibility.
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75 (1994),
reprinted in LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 36, at 274.
68
See LUBAN, Shaffer and Trollope, supra note 52, at 319.
69 See id.
70
Id.
71
72

Id. at 328.
Id.

Id. at 329.
See id. at 325-28.
75
See id. at 304 (describing briefly some of the lawyers in the book).
76
See id. at 303 (quoting THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN
LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 45-46 (1981)).
77 See id. at 305-06.
78 See id. at 305.
73

74
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Furnival represents an intermediate type of lawyer. His characteristics contrast with the more extreme amoral approach of the two
criminal defense lawyers he recruits to help Lady Mason: Chaffanbrass
and Aram (whom, in a move Professor Luban does not allow to go
unnoticed, Trollope depicts in anti-Semitic tones). 79 At the other side
of the spectrum is the idealistic neophyte barrister Felix Graham, who
displays a strong interest in German legal philosophy and becomes
lost in the real world of client representation, where he is unable to
muster any energy for Lady Mason's representation after developing
concerns about her truthfulness.8 0
Reading Professor Luban's exploration of lawyers' attitudes toward truthseeking in Orley Farm brings with it the pleasure of reading
his expression of the same ambivalence he sees in Trollope. 8 ' As Professor Luban puts it, "Trollope's dilemma is one that many of us
share. He dislikes the way lawyers defeat truth, and he rejects their
rationalizations, but he grudgingly admits that the job they do is an
important one and that the way they do it may sometimes be what the
job requires. '8 2 Here again, as in Miriam's case, lawyers who are loyal
to their client's interests, and do not push their clients too hard for
truth where it might play against those interests, are not necessarily
bad or wrong. Indeed, they may be adopting the more moral approach-albeit uncomfortably and sometimes unattractively so-than
that of an adviser who insists on adhering to a universal set of ethical
precepts regardless of the justice of particular situations.
Professor Luban organizes the book so that this final essay appears alone in a section entitled "Moral Messiness in Professional
Life."8 3 Its placement seems to herald where Professor Luban may
intend to head in his future work: into greater messiness, where one
cannot tie up conceptual dilemmas with neat analytic bows, and where
ideas emerge through the dialectic interplay of opposites and dialogues take place across disciplines, religious traditions, and centuries
of thought.
Also emerging from the book as a whole, but especially this last
essay, is a new particularism in Professor Luban's perspective.8 4 Even
his focus on his own Jewishness, a theme that emerges in several parts
of the book,8 5 arises most forcefully here.8 6 This new focus is almost
See id. at 305, 321.
See id. at 305, 325-26.
See id. at 325 ("Trollope turns out to be of two minds.").
Id. at 327.
83
See LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance,.supra note 6, at 229.
84
See LUBAN, Shaffer and Trolope, supra note 52, at 301.
85
See, e.g.,
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 1.
86
See generally LUBAN, Shaffer and Trollope, supra note 52 (usingJewish ethics to analyze
the work of Trollope and Shaffer).
79
80
81
82

1324

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1311

startling in its contrast to Professor Luban's earlier, more secular
voice. This preoccupation with religion perhaps further reflects Professor Luban's acknowledgment that he can only see through the
87
lenses of his own social location and identity.

That said, one should not make too much of this shift toward
particularism. Professor Luban has always been a pragmatic contextualist in some respects, especially on the merits of the adversarial system,8 8 and has frequently acknowledged the fact of structural
injustice. In Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, for example, Professor
Luban critiques Lon Fuller's doubt about whether legal systems can
have morally consistent rules as an internal matter, yet at the same
time exhibit "brutal indifference to justice and human welfare." 89 As
Professor Luban points out, almost every legal system ever in existence
adopted laws that denied equal legal rights to women. 90 This fact,
that law has systematically excluded women "from the community of
freedom," is one example of what Professor Luban describes as an
often "catastrophic asymmetry between whom the law binds and
whom the law helps."91 Other examples include "histories of slavery ...[and] ethnic subjugation." 92 As Professor Luban notes, "even
the most enlightened systems still contain pockets of
oppressiveness. ,,93
Professor Luban thus recognizes the importance of lawyers' and
others' efforts to remedy systemic injustice in legal systems. 94 But Professor Luban has not thus far taken the further step of explicitly connecting structural justice concerns to his theory of legal
representation more generally. This Essay suggests, however, that
these concerns may, increasingly but still implicitly, be driving his ethics conclusions at this more general level as well. Further evidence
that structural justice concerns are influencing Professor Luban's

87 See id. at 302.
88 See, e.g.,
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 13, at 55-57 (arguing that the
adversarial system isjustified only in a "weak, pragmatic way as a system we have historically
inherited, and for which it would be difficult to develop and implement a feasible
replacement").
89 See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LuBAN,
LEGAL ETHIcs AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 99, 127 [hereinafter LUBAN, Natural
Law].
90
Id. at 127 ("[A]lmost every regime that has ever existed has legislated expressly to
deny the self-determining agency of women.").
91
Id. at 128.
92 Id.at 127.
93 LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 5.
94
Cf LUBAN, Natural Law, supra note 89, at 126 ("Historically, the great social and
legal critics have been insiders or semi-insiders whose lively sense of critical morality allows
them to pass beyond their own self-interest and identify with the victims of bad law.").
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analyses comes from the very language and imagery Professor Luban
95
uses to describe different kinds of clients.
Power Contrasts in the Imagery of Legal Ethics and Human

B.

Dignity
I first began to notice the influence of a supplement to Professor
Luban's liberal individualist perspective in the contrasts between his
descriptions of the types of clients worthy of vigorous advocacy and
those whom lawyers should approach with more restraint. These contrasts exist throughout Legal Ethics and Human Dignity in the very language and imagery Professor Luban chooses. For example, clients
who deserve zealous representation include those who:
96
* "might otherwise be legally mute";
" need to be spared from "the humiliation of being silenced and
ignored[]]-;97
*

face an opponent who is "attempting to win an unfair, lopsided
judgment";98
* stand as the "hapless and innocent party[ ]";99
100
* are the "victims of [real estate and financial] predators";
* or are "the man-in-trouble."' 01

In contrast, the kinds of clients lawyers should approach more skeptically include:
10 2
* "Fried's profiteering slum lord or unscrupulous debtor";
10
• "the graymailing, anticompetitive multiglomerate"; 3
" those involved "when you're working on some deal that, if you
were to think it through, you'd realize that it was going to ruin
10 4
the lives of thousands of people and their families";
10 5
* where "the price is right";
* and situations involving "evils committed by 'quiet men with
white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who

do not need to raise their voice.' "106
The contrast between these two sets of descriptions powerfully
connotes inequalities of power and resources. Professor Luban's chosen imagery is embedded in class status, such as C.S. Lewis's descrip-

96

See infra Part II.B.
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 74.

97

Id. at 72.

98

LUBAN,

95

101

Adversary System Excuse, supra note 13, at 45.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id.

102
103

Id.
Id.

104

LUBAN,

105

LUBAN,

99
100

106

Integrity, supra note 7, at 267, 289 (quoting JOSEPH, supra note 7, at 41).
Contrived Ignorance, supra note 6, at 235.
Id. at 216 (quoting LEWIS, supra note 11, at x).
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tion of men with "white collars and cut fingernails,"' 0 7 with their
concomitant social power as those who possess authority and are confident of the force of their commands without even shouting.10 8 In
1 0
"silenced,"'''I
contrast stand those who are "mute,"109 "humiliated,"'
112
and "ignored."
Professor Luban appears to imply that a lawyer's
ethical analysis should depend in part on the relative power and privilege of her client in relation to other interests affected by the lawyer's
representation. Poor people and people facing powerful opponents
who may easily crush them-as in the case of "flesh-and-blood"
human defendants in the criminal justice system-deserve a lawyer's
most vigorous advocacy, while those in the opposite situation, poised
to crush others with the help of lawyers' services, warrant a different
representational stance. 113 In this latter context, a lawyer's ethical
compass should point in the direction of the search for justice, the
public interest, the consideration of others, or some similar formulation of justice-seeking legal representation. The requirements of morality call for lawyers to refrain from employing their personal agency,
enhanced by legal know-how and a law license, to cause or contribute
114
to the harming of others.
Anthony Alfieri, in his creative contribution to this Colloquium, 115 also sees an important relationship between the moral underpinnings of Professor Luban's legal ethics jurisprudence and social
justice concerns. Professor Alfieri's perspective arises from the requirements ofjustice with respect to axes of oppression based in race
or caste. Professor Alfieri's insights are particularly rich, and even
path-breaking, because they are anchored in the particular historical
context of U.S. race relations. For this reason, Professor Alfieri offers
many stimulating ideas about paths forward, including some that draw
on the concepts of restorative, redemptive, and reparative justice. 116
The more abstract structuralism on which I draw has a related
purpose in seeking to probe the ethical implications of the fact that
institutions structure human life so that different groups end up having vastly different resources, including access to power. 11 7 Perhaps
in future work, Professor Luban will apply his special philosopher's
107
108

Id.
See id.

109

LUBAN,

110

Id. at 79.

111

Id. at 72.

112

Id.

Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 74.

See id. at 87.
114 1 have suggested some very preliminary thoughts along these lines. See Carle, Power
as a Factor, supra note 56, at 137-43.
115 See Alfieri, supra note 17.
116
Id. at 1302-08.
117
Id. at 1303.
113
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tools to help guide scholars who seek to consider these relationships
between legal ethics and social justice concerns.
In his reply essay, Professor Luban does not address my query as
to how legal ethics should take account of structural inequality, but in
a recent symposium on his book he responded to this point by stating
that he views the limits of his theory as falling at the boundary of the
insights that can be gained from a liberal individualist focus on the
importance of human dignity rights.' 18 Nevertheless, I see no reason
why a structuralist supplement cannot add still more to the analysis,
especially where social justice concerns are at issue. To say this is not
to argue for eclipsing the important lessons learned through history
about the ethical limits to theories that emphasize institutional or
structural relations over individuals as the primary unit of analysis.
But just as the ethics of different religious traditions may present mutually illuminating contrasts," 9 might not the contrasts between individualist and structuralist insights further illuminate ethics analysis as
well?
In Part III, I explore further such lines of inquiry arising from an
analysis of the potential emerging connections between Professor
Luban's ethics analysis and concerns about structural inequality more
generally.
III
STRUCTURING INTEGRITY

A. Luban's Positive Ethics Theory
Consistent with his individualist framework, Professor Luban
anchors his positive theory of lawyers' ethics in a rights discourse concerned with protecting individual dignity.1 20 He acknowledges the potential vagueness of this discourse: because human dignity "can mean
anything," it also "means nothing.'

12

'

But Professor Luban believes

some tangible content can be poured into the human rights container
in the following way: What lawyers do to advance human dignity is to
help clients tell their personal stories, and also ensure that these stories are told in such a way that they will be heard.1 22 Lawyers thus give
effect to the individual's rights to have "a story of one's own,"' 123 "to be
118 David Luban, Comments During a Panel Discussion on Legal Ethics and Human
Dignity at Georgetown University Law Center (March 24, 2008).
119
Cf discussion supra Part II.A.2 (noting Luban's use of counterpunctual analytic
techniques in this way).
120
See, e.g., LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 2, at 3-6.
121
See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 68.
122
See id. at 68-69.
123
Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted).
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heard,"1 24 and to have "the first-personal, subjective character of the
story" acknowledged.

125

For reasons I discuss below, Professor Luban's use of human dignity as a fundamental concept for legal ethics analysis is ultimately less
than fully satisfying, at least absent a little tweaking. But first, here is
how Professor Luban does succeed in putting the concept of human
dignity to work: Professor Luban uses the case of Theodore Kaczynski
(the Unabomber) for illustration. He asks why it was ethically wrong
for Kaczynski's lawyers to seek to portray their client as mentally disturbed over their client's strenuous objections, even though in doing
so they hoped to save him from the death penalty.1 2 6 This was wrong,
Professor Luban convincingly argues, because the story Kaczynski's
lawyers wanted to tell about his mental state violated Kaczynski's dignitary rights.' 2 7 By telling a story Kaczynski did not want his lawyers to
tell, these lawyers were, "in Kaczynski's own words," transforming what
he saw as his important life's work, his manifesto explaining the reasons behind his acts as the Unabomber, into a story in which he
emerged as "a grotesque and repellent lunatic.'

1 28

Likewise, Professor Luban argues, lawyers should be required to
put the points a client wants to make into briefs they file on behalf of
that client. 129 The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
in Jones v. Barnes,130 but Professor Luban convincingly argues that this
case was wrongly decided. 131 The Court should have required
Barnes's lawyer to act on his client's wishes, even though the lawyer
judged the arguments ineffective, because to dismiss them was "an af' 13 2
front to Barnes's dignity as a human being and a story-bearer."
There is much to commend in ethics arguments based on advancing clients' dignitary rights. I hope that Professor Luban pursues this
line of analysis further, possibly drawing on the excellent literature
clinical law professors have developed on related topics.'

33

On their

analysis, clients' dignitary rights to have their story heard does not
begin with, or consist mainly of, their lawyer's courtroom advocacy,
but instead involves the lawyer's commitment to client-centered coun124

Id. at 69.

Id. at 70.
See id. at 77-79.
127
See id. at 79.
128
Id. at 78 (quoting United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
129
See id. at 74.
130
463 U.S. 745 (1983).
See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 74.
131
132
Id.
133
For examples of this literature see Carle, Power as a Factor,supra note 56, at 129-31
(discussing contributions to legal ethics thought of literature arising out of clinical
practice).
125
126
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seling in all aspects and stages of the relationship. 134 Professor
Luban's emphasis on the importance of locating law in lawyers' offices
rather than in courtrooms suggests that he would agree.
Professor Luban further argues that a model of lawyers' ethics
grounded in furthering individual dignity limits the rationale for client confidentiality to "flesh-and-blood clients" only.' 35 Up to here,
Professor Luban is correct in my view. 136 Professor Luban is less convincing, however, when he further suggests that the human dignity
rationale for lawyers' advocacy "provide [s] an argument for abolishing
confidentiality, not for preserving it." 1 3 7 This claim contradicts the

very idea that lawyers advance human dignity by telling clients' stories.
If lawyers' proper role is to advance clients' dignitary interests in having their stories told in the manner these clients wish, then surely the
right not to have parts of their stories told is equally part of clients'
dignitary rights.
This problem reveals the limits of a theory of lawyers' ethics
grounded in individual human rights alone. Such a theory quickly
runs into all of the well known stumbling blocks of liberal individualist
analysis: 138 Clients' dignitary rights and wishes about how to exercise
such rights quickly begin to conflict with the interests of other individuals who likewise possess dignitary rights, as well as with considerations of the public interest. On the surface at least, Professor Luban's
theory provides no good way to sort through which clients' dignitary
rights deserve vigorous promotion and which do not-or so it appears
from an individualist perspective, without more. 139 My thesis here,
however, is that Professor Luban brings a supplemental source of illumination to these matters. This allows a more complex analysis to
emerge in which structural factors may tip the balance in terms of
lawyers' appropriate ethics stances. Where clients are underdogs,
such as Miriam 140 or Lady Mason, 14 1 a more vig6rously pro-client
stance often appears indicated; the opposite tilt may be appropriate
with a client capable of crushing the interests of others. Or so it
134 This point deserves emphasis because it contravenes the current allocation of responsibilities between client and lawyer in Model Rule 1.2(a), which assigns decision making about "the means" of legal representation mainly to the lawyer. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2007).
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 87.
135
136
See Carle, Power as a Factor,supra note 56, at 144-45 (arguing against the fallacy of
equating corporations with individuals for purposes of legal ethics analysis).
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 9, at 80.
137
See Kruse, supra note 14, at 1351 ("[Slituations in which an adversarial practice
138
upholds the human dignity of one person at the expense of the human dignity of another
raise the most difficult cases for Luban's human dignity framework.").
139
See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 13, at 26 (noting, in the context of
zealous advocacy, that "everyone can't be in the right on all issues").
140
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
141
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seems, at least in faint outline. Perhaps Professor Luban's future work
will make his views more clear.
B.

Extending the Lessons of the Psychology Experiments

Another way in which Professor Luban's devotion to individualism unduly limits the potential reach of his insights is in the questions
he asks based on the experiments described in Part I.C above. 142
Every time I read Professor Luban's work in this area, I want to explore a side of the problem of the interaction between personal
agency and social surroundings that is not encompassed in the "shocking" calls to unethical conduct involved in those scenarios, or other
patently bad acts such as destroying documents, carrying out a partner's instructions to lie, padding bills, or any number of other decisions we immediately recognize as wrong.1 4 3 The problem I am
thinking of is the complicity of all successful human beings in surviving and advancing on the basis of privileges gained through conditions of structural injustice.
Almost anyone assessing the Milgram and Stanford experiments
with the benefit of distance and time would agree that the behaviors
observed were morally abhorrent. 144 But these situations are in some
ways less concerning because, even if it takes a while, such a shocked
moral recognition is likely in the end to surface. The more worrisome
harms are those that occur through mechanisms that are much
harder to point out and condemn. To take one example, drawn from
the academic settings in which many readers of this Essay are likely to
be familiar, consider the policies of institutions that end up excluding
most persons of less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds from the
kinds of higher education opportunities that best endow educational
and social capital.1 45 One such policy is the enormous weight these
institutions place on standardized tests that have harsh disparate impacts based on race and class. 146 These policies play a large role in
See discussion supra Part I.C.
See LUBAN, Integrity, supra note 7, at 273-75 (discussing ethical lapses in the practice
of law, in the context of the Milgram experiments).
144
See LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 8, at 242 (describing Milgram himself as
"flabbergasted by his findings" of destructive obedience).
145
See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 248 (2005) ("[O]ne of the stunning findings... is that the odds of getting into
the pool of credible candidates for admission to a selective college or university are six
times higher for a child from a high-income family than for a child from a poor family[.");
see also Susan D: Carle, ProgressiveLauyering in Politically DepressingTimes: Can New Models For
Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARv.J.L. & GENDER 323,
347 (2007) (summarizing other "literature documenting the unsurprising correlation between the socioeconomic class of a student's parents and the likelihood that she will attend
a more elite institution of higher education").
146
See, e.g.,
Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/CompellingInstitutions: Law Schools as
ConstitutionalLitigants, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1613, 1617 (2007) (noting that by the 1960s, elite
142
143
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perpetuating class privilege across generations, by shutting out the
very same groups that were once kept from enjoying privileges and
resources through dejure segregation. The policies of our institutions
thus contribute to the widening gulf between the haves and the havenots-in other words, to persistent and growing problems of structural injustice.
We can voice many rationales about why such policies are an unfortunate necessity, but the fact that the institutions with which law
professors are affiliated have this sorting and class perpetuation function is indisputable and, indeed, becomes all the more pronounced as
one climbs the academic elitism ladder. We know this to be true and
many of us abhor it; still, most of us report to our offices and collect
our paychecks without resigning in protest or demanding change to
the point of outright rebellion. Historically, of course, people have
similarly overlooked other manifestations of structural injustice in
their institutional settings, such as the sexism and racism to which Professor Luban refers,1 47 as well as the xenophobia and anti-Semitism we
could also add to this list of forms of discrimination disapproved dur148
ing the last century.
In his reply essay, Professor Luban responds to my point about
how persons gain privilege on the basis of structural injustice by arguing that this kind of "complicity is more or less independent of any
specific action we take; it is a kind of cosmic background radiation in
our moral lives.' 49 But my argument is precisely the oppositenamely, that there always are actions one could take in the face of
structural injustice.15 0 The question is when and how much of such
15t
action is ethically required.
It is possible to imagine a world in which it would be considered
morally inappropriate for institutions of higher education to maintain
admissions policies that widen group-based disparities in life opportunities. We do not currently live in such a society, but that does not
mean that protests against such policies are not possible or even ethically indicated. A very few voices are raising such challenges, pointing
out that there is no inherent reason why students who test as having
professional schools were using "admissions criteria (primarily test scores and undergraduate records) that had a marked disparate impact").
147
See LUBAN, Natural Law, supra note 89, at 128-29.
148
See generallyJEROLDS. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 71-72, 100-07 (1976) (discussing xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the
U.S. legal profession during the early twentieth century).
149
David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1437, 1446 n.51 (2008).
150
Professor Luban correctly observes, id. at 1439 n.13, that my arguments here are
connected to earlier work. See Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307 (2005).
151
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO "FORLD

WAR 11 (2008).
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attained the highest levels of a certain kind of analytic reasoning nec152
essarily deserve the "best" legal educations.
Most interesting, therefore, in drawing lessons from the Milgram
and Stanford experiments is their implications in suggesting a need to
institutionalize ethical reflectiveness about chronic forms of injustice
to which people become inured. Professor Luban points out an interesting paradox in this regard-namely, that the evidence shows that
individuals' tendency to make ideas conform with self-serving behavior becomes all the more pronounced to the extent that intellectual or
professional loyalties are not bought off by money. 153 As Professor
Luban explains, the experimental psychology literature suggests that
the less one is paid for taking a morally difficult position, the more
one is likely to work subconsciously to reconcile it with moral views
one believes are legitimate.1 4 Conversely, "the higher they bill, the
less likely [lawyers] are to deceive themselves into believing what they
say on behalf of clients.'

1 55

This point brings to mind Derrick Bell's seminal article, Serving
Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation.156 That article, which inaugurated a now-expansive literature on public-interest lawyering, examined the ethical complexities
of decisions NAACP lawyers made in the remedial phase of the Brown
litigation. 157 Those lawyers decided to pursue the uniform goal of
school desegregation in every case, despite the desires of some client
groups of African-American school children and their parents for alternative remedies, such as more resources for existing neighborhood
schools. 158 As Professor Bell wrote in one telling line, "Idealism,
though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control." 159 Reading
Professor Luban's use of the Milgram and Stanford experiments
through Professor Bell leads to questions about how ethicists should
think about the internalization of ideology in human conduct.

152
One eloquent voice calling for a creative rethinking of current assumptions about
who deserves the benefits of elite education is Lani Guinier. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV.
113, 137-71 (2003) (critiquing alternate approaches to admissions policies for educational
institutions).
See LUBAN, Integrity, supra note 7, at 269-70.
153
154

See id.

155 See id. at 270.
156 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976).
157 See id. at 478-82.
158 See id. at 482-88.
159 Id. at 504.
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The Problem of Ideology

Many examples of the operation of ideology as a system of ideas
to mask ethically problematic situations come to mind. Not surprisingly, the examples I see most clearly are those inconsistent with my
own beliefs. I wonder, for example, why is it that my students sometimes regard poor people in the United States as suffering from that
affliction through some fault of their own, while similarly destitute
persons who have suffered more recent "post conflict" traumas in exotic overseas locales deserve their brave efforts and concern. I wonder
why my employment law students are sometimes so hostile to the notion that job rights should accrue on the basis of seniority, when they
also tell me stories about parents cast into the ranks of the unemployed as a result of corporate reductions-in-force aimed at later-career workers. Or, to take an example to which Professor Luban
alludes, why do lawyers we regard as decent human beings not flinch
at being involved in commercial real estate deals that will lead to the
160
mass eviction of residents from their communities?
Moreover, as we all so clearly know as lawyers, our analyses of
legal and social problems often cannot even begin to grapple with the
problems of unintended consequences. Just a few examples include
the research showing that divorce reforms instituted by those who
pushed, with the best of intentions, for more liberal divorce laws had
the unintended effect of throwing more children into poverty;1 61 assessments of how the NAACP's school desegregation strategies destroyed the beneficial aspects of having African-American children
attend neighborhood schools, as just discussed; 62 or work on the ways
in which international sex-trafficking laws that ban prostitution end
up punishing the very class of destitute persons they were intended to
protect. 63
In short, most ethical problems are far harder to think about in
ethical terms than those involved in turning an electricity dial or brutalizing a prisoner under one's control because, very often, the connections between one's acts and their results are much more complex
and uncertain than those scenarios. In real life, the solutions to
problems of complicity in structural or institutional injustice seem
very hard indeed. In these contexts, it may be better not to walk off in
a huff of protest-vacating one's seat at the dials, so to speak, so that a
See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 13, at 48.
See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF DOWNWARD
MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLAss 202-28 (1988) (discussing the adverse financial
consequences of divorce on middle-class women and children).
See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
162
163
SeeJanet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006).
160
161
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Milgram experimental subject more prone to unthinking obedience
can take one's place. Is it better to keep one's seat at the table and
urge colleagues not to keep turning the dials; to stay and only pretend
to turn the dials; or to stay and turn the dials only a little rather than
all the way? I do not know of a literature that addresses these questions with Professor Luban's level of analytic rigor, and I hope he will
turn to some of these questions in future work.
In other words, I do not intend to advance a claim that lawyers
can, or should, always serve the side of the downtrodden angels; how
to help the cause of justice is often a puzzling, deeply problematic
question. But I do intend the claim, and wish to query Professor
Luban as to his thoughts on it, that lawyers may generally have ethical
responsibilities to puzzle through and attempt to exercise their moral
agency on the side of those with the least power and advantage in our
society.
I also want to suggest another problem that the Milgram and
Stanford experiments illuminate: The need to consider the institutional aspects of protecting dissent.
2.

The Problem of ProtectingDissent Within Institutions

To Professor Luban and the psychologists on whose work he relies, the fundamental ethical problem lies in flaws built into human
nature. 164 When confronted with a choice about doing something objectively terribly wrong, such as administering potentially lethal shocks
to human beings, a startling proportion of human subjects will do
what they are told, even while watching other human beings writhing
in apparent pain.' 65 One of the most interesting aspects of these findings concerns what they say about the importance of developing institutional structures that protect dissenters-that is, the 37 percent of
the experimental subjects who did not go along with the orders of the
Milgram experimenters. 16 6 Any independent thinker (and surely
many of us end up in the legal academy due to our inability to shed
this difficult personality trait) has experienced the penalties that come
from failing to resist the impulse of "speaking truth to power. 1 67 Or
so it probably often feels to those who venture to make points or take
stands they know will provoke disapproval from those around them.
On the other side, those inconvenienced by such displays of dissentusually those attempting to lead or manage institutions-perceive this
164
See LUBAN, Wrongful Obedience, supra note 8, at 239-42 (describing the results of the
Milgram obedience experiments and applying them to legal ethics).
165
See id. at 240.
166
See id.
167
The American Quakers claim to have coined this phrase sometime in the eighteenth century. See Speak Truth to Power, http://www/quaker.org/sttp.html.
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kind of behavior as disloyalty, or nuttiness, or perhaps a lack of political "pitch," deftness, or skill.
In retrospect, society lauds the behavior of institutional dissenters
as acts of political and moral bravery when they take place on a grand
scale that proves significant in historical perspective. But writ small,
on the murky scale of day-to-day life, people who engage in internal
institutional dissent go unheard and unheeded, at best. At worst, they
are figuratively or literally crushed within institutions.
Thus, one further lesson we might draw from Professor Luban's
analysis of the Milgram and Stanford results is the need to study effective means to protect the voicing of dissent within institutions, as well
as means of mitigating institutional tendencies to react harshly to such
conduct. 168 Which institutional features can work best toward these
ends? What values or characteristics of institutions allow acceptance
and constructive responses to dissent, nonconformity, difference, and
even plain weirdness, which may be an important close cousin to
dissent?
Recognizing this problem also points to the converse issue of
evaluating the ethics of institutional insiders who adopt strategies
short of open dissent in seeking to oppose institutional injustice or
wrongdoing. Professor Luban raises similar lines of inquiry in The Torture Lawyers of Washington, which examines the lawyers involved in
drafting the "torture memos" at the U.S. Department of Justice. 16 9
3.

A Case Study of Internal InstitutionalDissent

If one side of a structural analysis of legal ethics principles considers how to advance the causes of those with little institutional power,
the other side involves developing ethical precepts for those whose
privileged positions grant them a great deal of such power. One can
read Professor Luban's essay on the drafting of the torture memos
and its aftermath, which is among the most incisive commentaries I
70
have read on this subject, as a case study on this very question.'
Professor Luban aptly puts a finger on the reprehensibly unethical acts of the lawyers who drafted and approved the torture memos:
In the legal world, they are the moral equivalents of the Milgram subjects willing to shock human beings into unconsciousness.' 7' As Professor Luban explains, again getting the concept of human dignity to
168
For one leading scholar's work on related issues, see Robert Vaughn, America's First
Comprehensive Statute Protecting Coyporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2005).
169 See generally LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 4 (analyzing the ethical issues faced
by the lawyers who wrote memoranda about the law that should apply to the interrogation
of suspects detained by the United States on suspicion of terrorism).
170 See, e.g., id. at 173-74 (describing the dissent of top JAG officers to the torture
memos).
171
See, e.g., id. at 205 (condemning the work of the torture lawyers).
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perform substantive work, "Torture is among the most fundamental
affronts to human dignity, and hardly anything lawyers might do assaults human dignity more drastically than providing legal cover for
torture and degradation."' 172 The lawyers involved were like "Hitler's
lawyers la[ying] the legal groundwork for the murder of Soviet
' 7
POWs[. 11
3 Not only were their moral objectives reprehensible, but

their legal arguments also fell so far outside the standards of plausibility as to stand out as outrageous on this front as well. 174 The legal
prohibitions against torture include a number of international law instruments to which the United States is a signatory, as well as provisions of federal criminal law, the Constitution, and U.S. military
law. 175 As Professor Luban aptly puts it, to conclude that U.S. interrogators were free to disregard these many legal prohibitions against
cruel and degrading treatment violated "craft values common to all
1 76
legal interpretive communities."'
Most of the lawyers in Professor Luban's account of the torture
memos fall into the categories of (1) really bad guys, or (2) good guys,
of which there were only a few. Firmly in the bad guy column are
Boalt Hall ProfessorJohn Yoo, the actual drafter of the torture memos
during an academic leave to work for the Bush administration;17 7 Jay
S. Bybee, then head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), under
whose signature the memos went oUt; 178 and Alberto Gonzales,
then-White House Counsel. 179 Also heavily influential in the bad guy
group were hardliner Dick Cheney and his even more hardline legal
counsel, David Addington, whose wrath toward anyone who dared
180
question the hardliners' policies was legendary.
In the good guy column, Professor Luban mentions two lawyers
in particular: Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, who repeatedly argued against the use of cruel and degrading interrogation techniques,
and Chief Air Force JAG officer, Major General Jack L. Rives, who
wrote to his boss reminding him that "the use of the more extreme
interrogation techniques simply is not how the US armed forces have
operated in recent history."' 81 Instead, the armed forces "'take[ ] the
legal and moral "high road" in the conduct of our military operations

176

Id. at 163.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 165-68.
Id. at 198.

177
178

See id. at 162.
See id.

179

See id.

180

See id. at 173.

181

Id. at 173 (quoting a Memorandum from Major General Jack L. Rives for the Secre-

172

173
174

175

tary of the Air Force (February 5, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMEMCA 378

(Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006)
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regardless of how others may operate.' "1 8 2 As strategic advice alone,
how truly sage that opinion appears today. However, as Professor
Luban points out, these "politically independent JAG officers [were
kept] out of the advisory loop.'

83

This is the problem regarding in-

ternal institutional dissent discussed above: engage in it too directly
and one quickly finds oneself marginalized and stripped of power to
18 4
effect institutional change.
Most interesting in Professor Luban's taxonomy is the figure who
resides in an ethical gray area-namely Bybee's successor, Professor
Jack Goldsmith, who was appointed head of the OLC after the torture
memos were completed. 8 5 Unlike many commentators, Professor
Luban refuses to give Professor Goldsmith unqualified praise for the
steps he took to repudiate one of the torture memos and to later supervise the drafting-but not releasing-of a superseding memorandum that refuted in footnotes some of Professor Yoo's most
outrageous distortions of legal precedent.1 8 6 Professor Luban argues
that Professor Goldsmith and others instead should have strongly and
directly, in text rather than footnotes, quoted the language of Geneva
Convention Article 31, stating: "No physical or moral coercion shall
be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties[.]' ' 187 Professor Goldsmith

should have pointed out the purpose of relevant law, "to protect individuals in the clutches of their enemies," as embodied in this clear
and direct language.18 8 Such an argument "would have been fatal" to
89
the Administration's directly contrary policies.1
At the time Professor Luban wrote, he was largely relegated to
speculation about Professor Goldsmith's non-public acts within the
Id.
Id. at 174.
184
Professor Luban notes that the highest profile lawyer-heroes atJAG had a degree of
political independence. See id. at 173-74. But in my limited personal experience as an
expert witness in one Guantanamo Bay detainee case, even relatively low-level JAG officers
assigned roles in the representation of detainees have exhibited impressive moral courage
by resisting orders they viewed as compromising their legal ethics obligations. It is my
impression that the very strictness of the military culture of obedience to law may be responsible for these quite surprising displays of moral courage among some of the military
lawyers involved at Guantanamo Bay. The role of the JAG in the post-9/11 climate certainly deserves study in investigating the institutional conditions that protect or squash
moral dissent. It should come as no surprise that Professor Luban will soon publish an
article on this very topic. See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantdnamo,60 STAN.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
185
See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 4, at 184.
186 See, e.g., id. at 189 (describing how Goldsmith admitted, in a footnote, that "some
removals of prisoners might indeed violate Article 49 and constitute war crimes" (citation
omitted)).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
182
183
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OLC and the reasoning on which he based his conduct. However,
Professor Goldsmith has now published a revelatory book in which he
seeks tojustify his actions at the OLC. 190 In it, Professor Goldsmith is
best at analyzing what went wrong before he came on scene. He identifies a variety of institutional factors responsible for the production of
the torture memos, including supervisors' inadequate supervision of
Professor Yoo-which, coupled with their lack of substantive expertise
in the relevant areas of law, led them to defer too much to Professor
Yoo's legal interpretations. 19 1 Professor Goldsmith also points to the
atmosphere of fear and panic after 9/11 and the development of an
institutional culture that insufficiently valued careful legal judgment,
reasonable interpretation of law, and the other craft values the torture
memos flouted. 192 Addington's extreme temperament did not help
matters, nor did his notoriety in ruining the government careers of
1 93
Most
good lawyers who dared disagree with his hardline policies.
important, Professor Goldsmith argues, was the Bush Administration's
disregard of government traditions that sought "consultation and consent" from experienced actors in a variety of agency positions, such as
at the Department of State. 194 Bush insiders involved only a very small
handful of reliably like-minded lawyers in decision making on national security. 195 Not surprisingly, the results were bad decisions that
lacked the tempered quality gained from vetting the multiple perspectives of seasoned decision makers operating in a variety of different
institutional locations. 196
Consistent with Professor Luban's thesis that we cannot help but
attempt to justify our own conduct, the reader may find that Professor
Goldsmith has cloudier insights on his own shortcomings. A few interesting impressions emerge nonetheless. On Professor Goldsmith's account, a number of insiders recognized that the torture memos clearly
went far beyond acceptable legal analysis, as shown by Professor Goldsmith's own revocation of the 2003 torture memo well before the Abu
Ghraib scandal broke. 1 97 Professor Goldsmith seems to have been
stymied by an inner tension between his loyalty to the Bush adminis190

JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY- LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH

(2007).
See id. at 165-72.
See id.
See id. at 27-28.
194
Id. at 202-03.
195 See id. at 205-06.
196 See id. at 206; cf William H. Simon, The Past, Present, and Futureof Legal Ethics: Three
Comments for David Luban, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1365, 1374 (2008) (noting that group decisions not only "benefit from diverse perspectives," but also "force participants to articulate
and reflect on their notions in ways that they otherwise would not if they had made those
decisions on their own").
197
See GOLDSMITH, supra note 190, at 158.
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tration-especially the CIA operatives he felt he would leave legally
unprotected if he withdrew a second 2002 torture memo-and his legal judgment, which told him that the analysis in that memo was unsupportable. 198 This ambivalence paralyzed him until the Abu Ghraib
scandal altered the political context. 99
The overarching theme Professor Goldsmith wants to promote,
echoing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's concept of
"lawfare," 200 is that government actors find themselves in a bind when
they are forced to juggle political pressures to be effective along with
liability concerns that constrain their actions. Echoing Rumsfeld, Professor Goldsmith complains that enemies of the United States manipulate this bind for strategic advantage. 20 But Professor Goldsmith's
own account reflects the opposite lesson: his story shows that it was the
existence of good lawyers' craft values regarding permissible legal interpretation that allowed him to identify the torture memos' troubling
errors. By Professor Goldsmith's own report, it was these values that
eventually led to his resignation, timed to make it difficult for the Administration to reverse his belated decision to revoke the second 2002
torture memo.20 2 This is perhaps the most important and lasting lesson of Professor Goldsmith's narrative: institutional structures at least
sometimes preserve moral integrity in the face of contrary political
pressures by creating norms that value fidelity to the purposes of
3
law. 20
CONCLUSION

David Luban values personal integrity within institutions. This
Essay urges him to think about the interaction between structures and
institutions and the exercise of such personal integrity. There are
many settings in which case studies on this topic could be carried out.
Among the institutional locations most troubling today from a legal
ethics perspective are those in the Executive Branch, 20 4 where the curSee id. at 146-52.
See id. at 156-58.
See id. at 58-59. I am grateful to my colleague Rick Wilson for pointing out to me
the significance of this term in debates about U.S. terrorism policy.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 161-62.
203
This resonates with Professor Simon's theory of how lawyers should maintain an
ethical compass in the practice of law more generally. Cf WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACrICE
OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 138 (1998) (arguing that lawyers should take
those actions consistent with "justice," where justice is understood as "legal merit," broadly
conceived). An interesting question that arises in considering lawyers' ethics in the government context is whether the government lawyer's duty to follow the purposes of law is
properly considered to be greater than that of the lawyer representing a private client.
204
Professor Wendel, indeed, will soon publish an article examining lawyers' ethics in
this practice context. See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lauyers in the Liberal State, 60
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
198
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rent Administration's policies appear to have caused lasting damage
to norms that value fidelity to the purposes of law.
One aspect of that damage is the lasting harm it has caused to the
public reputation and honor of government service. This zeitgeist is
reflected in that bellwether of the attitudes of the current generation
in or soon headed to college and law school, J.K. Rowling's HarryPotter series. There, the institution reflecting the Wizarding world's
equivalent of the government is the Ministry of Magic, an agency full
of ineffectual, rumpled, insufficiently compensated bureaucrats such
as Ron Weasley's father, at best, and truly corrupt, evil functionaries in
league with the Death Eaters, at worst. 20 5 In Book Five, Harry Potter
and the Order of the Phoenix,20 6 the Ministry of Magic is the site of a
campaign of discriminatory and status-based persecution, murder,
and misuse of public office for heinous offenses. Book Seven, Harry
Potter and the Deathly Hallows,20 7 is a shockingly dark version of a so-

called children's book. It opens with a good witch being tortured; 20
proceeds to a scene in which the main female character, the teenager
Hermione, also endures painful and prolonged torture, vividly described; 20 9 and returns repeatedly to stories about the persecution, imprisonment, and torture of the family members of persons who refuse
to cave to the forces of evil. 210 How very different indeed are the enduring images that will mark this generation of children in comparison to the picture of childhood that Professor Luban provides at the
beginning of Legal Ethics and Human Dignity.
J.K. Rowling's fantasy reflection captures the current worldwide
focus on problems of institutional injustice and oppression, as well as
a new generation's lack of confidence in traditional approaches to
solving such problems. In this context, new approaches merit consideration. It would be a mistake to throw out liberal individualism, as
some would advocate. But I have argued here that it is likewise improvident to eschew the insights of structural supplements that highlight what Professor Luban so aptly coins the "background radiation"
of unjust institutional conditions. Such conditions perpetuate vast
and growing rifts in resources and power among various groups and
cause great human suffering. They accordingly raise ethical conundrums for all human beings, including, or even especially, as Professor
Luban has cogently shown, 21 1 lawyers-who, after all, have special
tools and responsibilities for engineering 'justice." How lawyers
205

J.K
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See id. at 805-06.
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208

J. ROWLING, HARRY
See id. at 10-18.

209

See id. at 375-85.
See id. at 7-12, 463-74.
See discussion supra Part I.A.

210
21 1

ROWLING, HARRY POTrER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX
POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS

passim (2003).

(2007).
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should be ethically charged to work toward this end is unclear, but I
have argued that legal ethicists' responsibility to consider these issues
is not.
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